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«Piecemeal, incremental, ad hoc»:
‘Beccarian’ experiments in law enforcement in 
late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century 
England
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Abstract. In the course of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century a series 
of measures were introduced into the practice of law enforcement in England which, 
though «piecemeal, incremental, ad hoc» were, J.M. Beattie claims, driven by a com-
mon belief in the need for more effective ways of dealing with a perceived dramatic 
rise in urban property crime...These included preventative measures such as improve-
ments in street lighting and gradual recognition of the need for professional polic-
ing, measures – such as statutory rewards to informers – designed to encourage pros-
ecutions and raise conviction rates, and state-funded transportation, which provided a 
punishment more appropriate to petty crime than the death penalty.  Though many of 
these measures, diverged sharply from Beccarian principles, Beattie is right in claim-
ing that in general terms they «anticipated some of the arguments that would be made 
by the reformers of the late 18th century». If this has not been noticed previously it 
is because scholars have focused on the history of ideas at the expense of changes in 
practice the resulting from thousands of individual decisions by made by ordinary 
people, and even by apparently powerless. 
Keywords. Beccaria, England, Prevention, Conviction, Judicial procedure, Punish-
ment.
WELCOMING BECCARIA. 
From its first appearance Cesare Beccaria’s treatise (or essay) On Crimes 
and Punishments aroused a degree of enthusiasm among British intellectu-
als which historians of ideas have not found easy to account for1. As Hugh 
Dunthorne puts it somewhat wryly, «the English have not often turned to 
foreign writers for advice about how to govern themselves»2. David Lieber-
1 The title of the first English translation, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments, a title which 
includes a genre indicator suggesting an exploratory aspect not highlighted in the original;  R. 
Loretelli, Cesare Beccaria, in Inghilterra prima di Jeremy Bentham. La specificità inglese, «Anti-
gone», 3, 2014, p. 119.
2 H. Dunthorne, Beccaria and Britain, in D. H. Howell and K.D. Morgan (eds.), Protest and Police 
in Modern British Society, University of Wales Press, Cardiff 1999, pp. 73-96: 75. 
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man has seen Beccaria as having been warmly received 
because he was «preaching to the converted»3, indeed 
flattering in his admiration of liberties and institutions 
– such as jury trial and rejection of judicial torture and 
“cruel and unusual punishments” – sanctified in Whig 
tradition4. As Anthony Draper noted, Beccaria’s fun-
damental contention that deterrence, rather than state 
retaliation, should be the goal of punishment had long 
been current in English penal theory5. On the other 
hand, Draper also pointed out, Beccaria’s ideas were wel-
comed by English jurists not because they reflected the 
English status quo, but because they chimed with vari-
ous current dissatisfactions with the practice of punish-
ment, dissatisfactions that were to be expressed in the 
late 1760s and 1770s by William Blackstone, William 
Eden, and Jeremy Bentham. Looking back to earlier 
decades, Dunthorne sees Beccaria’s proposals as having 
«harmonized with a debate on the reform of the coun-
try’s criminal justice system that had been proceeding 
intermittently for a generation or more», citing Bernard 
de Mandeville’s 1725 critique of public execution as inef-
fective as a deterrent, Samuel Johnson’s denunciation of 
«confusion of remissness and severity» in the penal laws 
in the Rambler of 20 April 1751, and Oliver Goldsmith’s 
insistence on the need for a «sense of distinction in the 
crime»6.
Whether these scattered polemics add up to a 
«debate» is doubtful; and the decades preceding what is 
generally recognized as the penal reform movement pro-
duced no clear, systematic critique of the judicial system. 
What it did produce was a series of practical changes in 
methods of law enforcement which, though «piecemeal, 
incremental, ad hoc», were driven by a common belief in 
the need for more effective and less socially disruptive 
ways of dealing with a perceived dramatic rise in urban 
property crime of all kinds, from pickpocketing and 
shoplifting to burglary and highway robbery7. The object 
of my contribution is to call attention to these changes 
as charted by social historians of crime and justice in 
the period between the Restoration of the monarchy in 
1660 and the middle of the eighteenth century. One of 
the most important of these, John Beattie, sees them as 
having
3 D. Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge 2009, p. 207; quoted in A. J. Draper, Cesare 
Beccaria’s Influence on English Discussions of Punishment, 1764-1789, 
«History of European Ideas», 26, 2000, pp. 177-199. 
4 Draper, Cesare Beccaria’s Influence, cit., pp. 182-183.
5 Ibidem, p. 184.
6 Dunthorne, Beccaria and Britain, cit., pp. 76-77.
7 J.M. Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, 1660-1750. Urban 
Crime and the Limits of Terror, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, 
p. 464. 
anticipated Beccaria’s emphasis on the importance of pre-
venting crime, and some of his attitudes towards punish-
ment – in particular that moderate punishment, adjusted 
to fit the crime and administered quickly and with certain-
ty, would provide more effective deterrence than occasional 
displays of extreme violence on the scaffold8.
Attentive not only to parliamentary legislation and 
decisions by central government, Beattie scrutinises also 
local government initiatives and court practice in met-
ropolitan London, where the problem of urban crime 
was felt most strongly and where many of the measures 
intended to deal with it originated.  In what follows I 
shall adopt his grouping of these measures under four 
heads: 
measures to improve the prevention of crime; to encour-
age detection and the prosecution of offenders; to ensure 
the conviction of the guilty offenders; and to make punish-
ments more effective9. 
PREVENTING CRIME. 
«It is better to prevent crimes than to punish them» 
is a constant refrain in Dei Delitti e delle pene10. Ch. XI, 
entitled «Della Tranquillità pubblica», lists several prac-
tical measures recommended as efficacious in prevent-
ing popular disturbances, the first of which are pub-
licly financed street lighting and the placing of guards 
around the city. Together with restrictions on heated 
religious discourse and the giving of harangues promot-
ing adherence to the public interest, these measures con-
stituted in Beccaria’s view one of the main branches of 
magisterial vigilance as understood in the French of the 
time as the police. How to «police the night streets» was 
an issue at the heart of early modern England’s efforts to 
“keep the peace”, namely contain immorality and disor-
der and thus prevent crime in urban contexts. 
In the pre-modern world it was generally assumed 
that, with few exceptions, innocent people would not 
be found on the city streets after dark: «that the night 
gave cover to the disorderly and the immoral, and to 
those bent on robbery or burglary or who in other ways 
threatened physical harm to people in the streets and 
in their houses»11. Until the late sixteenth century Lon-
don relied for protection from such dangers on its 9 pm 
curfew, on the closing of the City gates, and on house-
8 Ibidem, p. 463.
9 Ibidem.
10 C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene, Armando & Armando, Roma, 
1998, cap. XLI.
11 Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, cit., p. 169. 
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holders fulfilling customary preventative policing duties: 
acting as unpaid night watchmen, and placing candles in 
tin lanterns with horn sides outside their houses during 
moonless, winter evening hours. By the mid-seventeenth 
century, however, the citizens of London were proving 
increasingly unwilling to patrol the night streets, prefer-
ring to pay fines out of which inadequate and unregu-
lated substitutes were employed for scanty wages. Mean-
while the curfew collapsed under pressure from a swell-
ing population and the sprouting of shops, eating-houses 
and commercial places of entertainment, while for the 
wider thoroughfares of the city as rebuilt after the Great 
Fire of 1666, candles provided grossly inadequate illumi-
nation12.
Both issues were addressed by fits and starts and at 
local level. Street lighting was to be one of several public 
service provisions supported by taxes but carried out by 
private companies, yet special in that it was 
thought of as a policing device in a new, more specific way 
and more modern way as a way of bringing the streets 
under surveillance and control. Effective lighting would 
help pedestrians to be on their guard and the night watch 
and constables to prevent crime and to be able to distin-
guish between those who had legitimate reasons to move 
around the city in the dead of night and those who did 
not13. 
As with other aspects of policing, the modernisa-
tion of London’s street lighting involved the replacement 
of customary participation by an obligation to pay for 
a service.  From the 1660s and 70s groups of project-
ors were experimenting with various types of oil lamps, 
encouraging householders to pay them to take over the 
duty to place candles14. Later came tempting offers to 
the City Corporation, which was nearing bankruptcy, of 
large sums for monopoly privileges in providing a range 
of public services. In 1694 a first contract for oil lamps 
was awarded, and the following year a 21-year mono- 
poly was sold to the Convex Light Company. At the 
same time an Act of the Common Council of aldermen 
and commoners which administered the City extend-
ed the obligation to place candles by two hours and 
imposed a hefty penalty on defaulters, thus virtually 
forcing householders into paying the Company’s fees for 
installing and maintaining its lamps15.  
There was to be no going back on these measures, 
which met rising expectations of urban amenities on 
the part of the middling sort, and responded to fears 
12 Ibidem, p. 172.
13 Ibidem, p. 224.
14 Ibidem, pp. 210-213.
15 Ibidem, p. 215.
of gangs of street robbers and burglars, whose activities 
were loudly publicised in the flourishing literature of 
crime of the 1720s. In 1735 a committee set up by Com-
mon Council expressly to deal with lighting moved that 
«the better to prevent Robberies and other inconven-
iences» street lamps be lit from sunset to sunrise every 
night of the year, and petitioned parliament for powers 
to defray expenses. This was rapidly followed by a Light-
ing Act which set up a rating scheme based on values 
of houses, instituted all-night, year-long street lighting, 
regulated the types of lamps to be set, maximum dis-
tances between them, set limits on charges, and author-
ised wards to arrange contracts with companies as they 
saw fit.  By the mid seventeen thirties, the City of Lon-
don was probably «the best lit urban area in Europe»16.
 Professionalization of surveillance proceeded 
more erratically and less deliberately. In 1661, 1662 and 
again in 1663 Common Council recognised the need for 
«better ordering and strengthening» the night watch, 
but could only reiterate the obligation of all London 
householders to fill the customary quota of watchmen 
for each ward.  The de facto transition to a paid night 
watch was not, however, conceptualised until the 1690s, 
when alarm over the perceived crime wave, and com-
plaints about corruption, lax time-keeping, feeble and 
unsuitably-armed watchmen came to a head. In 1705 
the Council passed an act which called for watchmen to 
be «able-bodied», thus implicitly recognising their em- 
ployee status, but failed to confront the question of how 
they were to be paid17. It was not until 1737 that wards 
were authorised to levy rates to pay watchmen’s wages, 
which were made uniform across London. In other 
respects the watch and its financing was still organised 
locally however, so that rich, inner city wards continued 
to be better policed than the large, poor and crowded 
outskirts. Nevertheless, the 1737 Act, and similar ones 
passed for Westminster parishes, Beattie comments, 
«marked a significant moment [...] it translated the 
obligation to serve in person into an obligation, eas-
ily enforced, to pay in support of a service provided by 
waged officials»18.
It was to take much longer for the gradual, de fac-
to transformation of the ancient and customary office 
of constable to be officially recognised.  Traditionally 
an unpaid, community duty to which local household-
ers were called in rotation, the office had always been 
a complex one, involving what, in a classic essay, Joan 
Kent described as a «dual allegiance»: 
16 E.S. De Beer, ‘Early History,’ 323, quoted in Beattie, Policing and Pun-
ishment in London, cit., p. 223.
17 Ibidem, p. 186.
18 Ibidem, p. 197.
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On the one hand, the constable was the lowest officer in a 
hierarchy of authority that stretched from the monarchy to 
the village [...] On the other hand, the constable also had to 
represent the village’s interests to his superiors19.
With the expanding scope of criminal, social and 
economic legislation under the Tudors and Stuarts, con-
stables’ duties were extended enormously. By the late 
seventeenth century they were responsible for a vast 
range of tasks, from reporting newcomers, vagrants, 
unlicensed beggars, runaway servants, labourers refus-
ing to work, gamblers, drunks, blasphemers, lewd per-
sons, nightwalkers, singers of seditious ballads and peo-
ple committing victimless offences and misdemeanours 
of many kinds20. In Europe’s fastest-growing city, the 
burden of crowd and traffic control grew heavier, as did 
– under pressure from the turn-of-the-century Reforma-
tion of Manners movement – expectations of what con-
stables should do to enforce the vice laws21. 
All this the men chosen to serve their year as con-
stable were meant to reconcile with earning a living by 
other means. It is no wonder that, of those who could 
afford it, many chose to pay the fine for avoiding their 
turn, or finance men poorer than themselves to stand in 
for them22. During the seventeenth century the practice 
of paying substitutes grew steadily, especially in the richer 
wards. By the 1720s over 100 out of 360 London consta-
bles were deputies, and by the 1750s some 90% of men 
elected were buying their way out of office. Many hired 
men served repeatedly, sometimes taking on other paid 
posts such as that of beadle, and/or acting as or in asso-
ciation with entrepreneurial thief takers. By the end of 
the eighteenth century amateur community representa-
tives had in practice been completely replaced by a body 
of paid professionals, a transformation signalling a «sea-
change in thinking about policing issues»23. As we shall 
now see, this shift in recruiting methods was associated 
with a change in the nature of law enforcement: the emer-
gence of detection as a function of professional policing. 
PROSECUTION PROCEDURES. 
Although both watchmen and constables were 
sometimes called upon to help search or collect evidence 
19 The English Village Constable, 1580-1642: The Nature and Dilemmas of 
the Office, «Journal of British Studies», 20, 1981, pp. 29-49: 30-31. 
20 R.B. Shoemaker, Prosecution and Punishment. Petty Crime and the 
Law in London and Rural Middlesex, c. 1660-1725, Cambridge Universi-
ty Press, Cambridge 1981, p. 217. 
21 Ibidem, pp. 124, 155.
22 Policing and Punishment in London, cit., p. 134. 
23 Ibidem, p. 157. 
for use in court, the detecting, arrest and prosecution of 
offenders remained throughout the eighteenth century 
the responsibility of private citizens. It was usually vic-
tims of crimes - if anyone – who noticed a loss, suspect-
ed someone and, perhaps aided by neighbours, servants, 
passers-by or a patrolling watchman, grabbed him or 
her and “carried” – perhaps with the help of a constable 
fetched for the purpose – the supposed offender before 
a magistrate. It would then be up to the apprehender to 
organise witnesses and other evidence to set first before 
a grand jury and, if accepted by that body, a petty jury 
in a court of assize. 
Prosecution was thus an expensive and time-con-
suming business, and only very partially compensated 
after 1714, when governments began paying the costs of 
bringing cases in which they had an interest 24. Private 
citizens would in any case risk loss of earnings, damage 
to reputation and, with hanging the only penalty for an 
ever-growing number of offences, in theory responsibil-
ity for the death of a man, woman or even a child found 
guilty of stealing something as small as a handkerchief. 
The size of the “dark figure” of unprosecuted crime is 
impossible to calculate, but historians agree that it was 
probably huge25. Many victims certainly preferred to set-
tle informally with the thief, perhaps compounding for 
the return of their goods, and/or resorting to traditional 
forms of shaming punishment, such as beating or dows-
ing under a water-pump.  
Beccaria explicitly condemned private “forgiving” of 
offenders (Ch. XXIX), and as a contractualist could nev-
er have condoned the survival of such informal, amateur 
methods of administering justice. But neither would he 
have approved many of the measures instituted by turn-
of-the-century parliaments in their efforts to encourage 
prosecutions. Chapter XXXXVI of the Essay denounces 
the offering of rewards for the capture of offenders as 
confessions of weakness on the part of the state, expe-
dients which might temporarily shore up a crumbling 
edifice but in the long run undermine morality and vir-
tue, trust in social relations, the happiness and peace 
of the whole nation. In England there had long been a 
tradition of offering ad hoc rewards for convicting fel-
ons and religious dissenters, but after the Glorious Rev-
olution rewards became «a fundamental aspect of pub-
lic policy»26. The 1692 Act instituting a £40 reward for 
convicting a highway robber was quickly followed by 
similar measures against counterfeiters and coiners, then 
24 Ibidem, pp. 384-387.
25 P. King, Crime, Justice and Discretion in England 1740-1820, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2000, p. 11.
26 J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1986, p. 51. 
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shoplifters, burglars, housebreakers and horse thieves. 
During the robber gang scares of the early 1720s all the 
streets of London and Westminster, including lanes and 
courts, were re-categorised as highways, and an astro-
nomical £100 temporarily added to the standard £40.  
Beattie finds it likely that the policy of massive 
rewards «had the effect they were meant to have and 
encouraged victims to give chase and to get others to 
join them in tracking down a robber or burglar»27. In the 
long run, however, Robert Shoemaker sees the rewards 
policy as having brought about «a significant transfer of 
responsibility from those on the streets being expected to 
help out of a sense of duty to giving those with informa-
tion an incentive to come forward»28.  A secondary effect 
– and again one that Beccaria could not have approved 
– was to stimulate the growth of thief-taking as a trade. 
Though not new to the English scene, thief-takers show 
a «marked increase» in the course of the eighteenth cen-
tury. «Without their knowledge of criminal networks», 
Shoemaker admits, «far fewer major criminals would 
have been apprehended»29, but by the mid century asso-
ciations with “blood money” and scandals involving 
“thief-making”, malicious prosecution and extortion had 
caused the government to abandon the massive rewards 
policy. Nevertheless when, in the mid 1750s, Henry and 
John Fielding began organising a regular, paid force of 
detectives, it was from among thief-catchers as well as ex-
constables that they recruited a body known at the time 
as «Fielding’s traps», but later as «Bow Street Runners». If 
the old appellative witnesses to the survival of past prac-
tices, the one more familiar to us reflects the transforma-
tion of private, unregulated expedients into state-regulat-
ed strategies.  In this and other areas of justice admin-
istration, such as the collecting of data and development 
of techniques of cross examination, these extraordinar-
ily energetic magistrates worked to coalesce «a series of 
single small-scale adjustments to necessity and barely 
perceptible shifts in attitude [...] into an articulated pro-
gramme [by which they] sought to transform Londoners’ 
immediate response to crime from one of self-help to one 
of relying on the police»30. 
Two of a growing breed of «trading justices»31, the 
Fieldings were also anomalous in that the elder was 
legally trained and, as court justices, both were paid by 
the state. In 1718 William Nelson was one of many who 
complained about corruption and laziness among J.P.s, 
27 Ibidem, p. 55.
28 R.B. Shoemaker, The London Mob: Violence and Disorder in Eight-
eenth-Century England, Humbledon Continuum, London 2004, p. 36
29 Ibidem, p. 39.
30 Ibidem, p. 41. 
31  . Landau, Law, Crime and English Society, 1660-1830, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge 2002, ch. 3. 
and but was well ahead of his time in proposing that 
half of those appointed be stipendiary, and be subject to 
strict discipline32: no such appointments were made until 
1792.  As with constables, and unlike the salaried offi-
cials of continental Europe, the Justices of the Peace of 
early modern England were «unpaid men of fortune who 
administered the communities in which they resided»33. 
Created in the fourteenth century «to hear and deter-
mine felonies and trespasses done against the peace», by 
late Tudor times they were responsible for many aspects 
of local government and trade regulation, as well as for 
conducting pre-trial examinations of men and women 
accused of felonies, taking bonds guaranteeing appear-
ance in court and good behaviour, and committing sus-
pects to prison to await trial. By the late seventeenth 
century they also exercised jurisdiction over the entire 
range of misdemeanours, a huge category which includ-
ed certain kinds of theft, vice, regulatory and poor law 
offences, as well as breaking the peace34. 
In a period when financial and commercial affairs 
were demanding more time from merchants and bank-
ers, the kinds of men who traditionally served as City 
aldermen and magistrates, the burdens of judicial office 
were also being complicated by innovations in the penal 
code and in the procedures intended to encourage pros-
ecutions. With extension of the death penalty, the intro-
duction of massive rewards and of pardons for accom-
plices on the one hand, and the ‘lawyerization’ of the tri-
al bringing closer scrutiny of evidence on the other, the 
magisterial decision-making process was becoming ever 
more «complex, perhaps more difficult, or uncomfort-
able». The J.P.’s preliminary hearing in particular a «far 
more complex procedure [...] [with] a more uncertain 
outcome»35. These and other reasons have been offered 
for the «flight from office»36 which affected London’s 
magistracy even more adversely than it did other com-
munity officers. By the turn of the century the judicial 
business of London and Middlesex «was concentrated 
in the hands of a few very active justices»37, and by the 
late 1720s, in those of just two: Sir William Billers and 
Sir Richard Brocas.  When these men died, in 1734 and 
1737 respectively, a rota system was hurriedly set up. 
With a regular timetable involving all the aldermen who 
were J.P.s, an attendant attorney and clerk, and a formal, 
public location in the Matted Gallery of the Guildhall, 
the City thus gave birth to the first regular magistrates’ 
32 Office and Authority of a Justice of the Peace, London, 17217.
33 N. Landau The Justices of the Peace, 1679-1760, University of Califor-
nia Press, Berkeley 1984, p. 1.
34 Shoemaker, Prosecution and Punishment, cit., p. 6. 
35 Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, cit., pp. 106-107. 
36 Ibidem, p. 147.
37 Shoemaker, Prosecution and Punishment, cit., p. 236. 
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court, one which «did not depend entirely on the whim 
of a magistrate, but had a permanent life and a pub-
lic character»38. Once again, necessity brought changes, 
changes soon to be developed by the Fieldings, who not 
only restructured their Bow Street offices into a space 
resembling a courtroom but also, by extending their 
functions in investigating and organising prosecutions, 
«created a new kind of urban magistracy»39.
If in this respect judicial practice was by the third 
decade of the new century being rationalised, in other 
ways it remained almost unregulated. The J.P.s before 
whom plaintiffs accused their suspects enjoyed a degree 
of freedom in decision-making quite incompatible with 
Beccaria’s utopian prohibition of interpretation. In some 
cases decisions were taken in “Sessions”, i.e. by at least 
two magistrates acting together, but many – a proportion 
that increased in the course of the eighteenth century – 
were dealt with by individual justices and by most in the 
privacy of their own homes. In no case were their rulings 
subject to state regulation, and very rarely to disciplinary 
measures: «[n]either central government nor parliament 
told them what to do, supervised them or even ensured 
that they acted at all»40. Especially in dealing with the 
petty offenses which constituted the majority of those 
brought before them, justices could choose whether to 
mediate a dispute, bind over the defendant to appear at 
the next Sessions, or – in certain cases – issue a sum-
mary conviction on the spot and sentence the offend-
ers to pay a fine, to be whipped, or to be committed to a 
house of correction41. Shoemaker’s study of the conduct 
of seventy-one justices active in Middlesex around the 
turn of the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries reveals 
dramatic differences in judicial behaviour [...] fundamen-
tally different conceptions of the nature of justice and the 
purpose of prosecutions and punishments. Consequently, 
people’s expectations of the criminal justice system varied 
considerably depending on the identity of the justice who 
handled the case42. 
At the opposite pole in this respect to the uniform 
and automatic decision-making process augured by Bec-
caria, the English judicial system was «shot through 
with discretionary powers»; as we shall now see, this 
applies not only to the apprehending of suspects and 
preliminary hearings, but to «every stage of the trial and 
[...] administration of punishment»43.  
38 Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, cit., p. 94.
39 Ibidem, p. 418. 
40 Landau, Introduction, The Justices of the Peace, 1679-1760, cit.
41 Shoemaker, Prosecution and Punishment, cit., p. 23.
42 Ibidem, p. 233.
43 Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, cit., p. 406. 
In one important respect J.P.s had little room for 
manoeuvre. Bail statutes still in force from the time of 
Mary Tudor stipulated that a magistrate before whom 
a man or woman was accused of a felony must merely 
record the prosecution testimony and commit the sus-
pect to prison to await examination of the bill of indict-
ment by a Grand Jury of seventeen, usually wealthy men 
of some social standing. If the bill was found “true”, the 
accused would then go to trial before a Petty Jury of 
twelve, in London for the most part artisans and shop-
keepers, many with previous court experience. Despite 
the fact that they heard only prosecutors’ versions of 
events, Grand Juries threw out «significant numbers» 
of property charges, perhaps because they took into 
account a broad range of factors: not only the nature of 
the offence and the characters of offender and prosecu-
tor, but also economic conditions of the time and the 
«general aim of preserving order and harmony»44. Dur-
ing the late seventeenth century London Petty Juries 
were «notably lenient», acquitting on average 45% of 
those brought before them; acquittal rates were subse-
quently to drop off, but still remained as high as 30%45. 
In addition juries exercised «massive discretionary pow-
ers», resorting in over 15% of cases to “partial verdicts”, 
i.e. convictions for less serious offenses than those on 
indictments46. Even then, those found guilty could and 
often were reprieved by the judge, or could have a peti-
tion of mercy presented to the monarch; in the late sev-
enteenth century 40% of those condemned received par-
dons. 
By such means early modern jury and court practice 
worked to mitigate the effects of the harsh penal legisla-
tion passed during the Tudor «assault on crime», allow-
ing large numbers of men and women found guilty to 
go free. As we have seen, during the second phase of the 
making of the “Bloody Code” several of the more inno-
vative measures passed by parliaments between 1690 and 
1713 were designed to encourage prosecutions, while 
others were meant to ensure higher rates of conviction. 
We know very little about how juries reached their ver-
dicts. Drawn from the neighbourhood in which the 
crime had been committed, jurors were originally meant 
to rely on their prior knowledge or inform themselves 
of the facts of a case.  By the sixteenth century, how-
ever, population growth and mobility were rendering 
these expectations vain, and juries were relying largely 
on accounts and character testimony provided in court 
by witnesses. But convincing evidence from victims, 
especially eye-witness testimony, was not always forth-
44 Ibidem, pp. 401-405. 
45 Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, cit., pp. 284-285.
46 Ibidem, pp. 277-286.
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coming47, a problem to which late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century governments responded by extend-
ing to criminals themselves offers virtually impossible to 
refuse. The 1692 Act «for encourageing the apprehend-
ing of Highway Men», for example, established 
That if any person or persons being out of Prison shall dis-
cover Two or more person or persons [who already hath 
or hereafter shall commit any Robbery so as two or more 
of the person or persons discovered shall be convicted of 
such Robbery any such discoverer shall himself have and 
is hereby entituled to the gracious pardon of Their Majes-
ties Their Heires and Successors for all Robberies which he 
or they shall [have] committed at any time or times before 
such discovery48.
A statute of 1695 offered identical terms to «discov-
erers» of coiners and clippers, as did the 1699 «Shop-
lifting Act» to discoverers of a motley assortment of 
thieves.  By means of this legislation, «both the authori-
ties and private prosecutors actively sought the coopera-
tion of accomplices as the most likely means of appre-
hending and convicting offenders»49, a means which and 
in certain cases offered the courts their only hope of a 
guilty verdict: 
The fundamental fact was that in the absence of regular 
police and detective forces, immunity from prosecution 
(along with the offer of rewards) gave the authorities their 
only means of securing evidence, especially against mem-
bers of gangs50. 
According to Beccaria, in a perfect legal system par-
dons had no place, for mercy should be a characteristic 
of the legislator, while the executor should be inexorable 
(ch. XVLVI). Ch. XXXVII of the Essay further argues 
that to offer impunity to those willing to implicate con-
federates is particularly odious in that it authorizes 
treachery and cowardice of the most contagious kind, 
and exposes the weakness of a legal system reduced to 
begging help from those who offend it. In effect, and as 
with the rewards policy, in mid eighteenth-century Eng-
land accomplice pardoning proved open to abuse, lead-
ing to false accusations by men and women in danger 
of their lives, and extortion of payment in exchange for 
47 Crimes defined as private (pocket picking, shop lifting) were by defi-
nition carried out without the victim’s knowledge; others, such as street 
robbery and burglary, carried fears of retaliation.
48 Ch. VIII Rot. Parl. pt. 3. no. 3. William and Mary, 1692: An Act for 
encourageing the apprehending of Highway Men [Ch. VIII Rot. Parl. pt. 
3. nu. 3.], accessed at https://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/
vol6/pp390-391
49 Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, cit., p. 366. 
50 Ibidem, p. 369.
silence. Like other forms of evidence, such as hearsay and 
confession, accomplice evidence came increasingly under 
scrutiny in the course of the eighteenth century, especial-
ly as solicitors became more active in pre-trial hearings 
and barristers in court51. Yet the practice of pardoning 
accomplices seems to have persisted, may have become 
more common, and was eventually to lead to the devel-
opment of the modern crown witness system52.
Two other innovations, apparently favourable to 
defendants, were in Beattie’s view intended to encour-
age prosecutors and ensure higher rates of conviction. 
Until the end of the seventeenth century, and in order 
to save them from committing perjury and thus jeop-
ardising their souls, neither defendants nor defence wit-
nesses were required to give evidence under oath53. This 
changed in 1702, when a statute aimed at punishing 
accessories and receivers, who were increasingly suspect-
ed of giving false evidence in support of the thieves who 
supplied them, were required to ‘take an oath to depose 
the truth the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in 
such a manner as the witness for the Queen are by law 
obliged to do; and if convicted of any wilful perjury’ to 
suffer the consequences. 
The other apparent concession to defendants, in fact 
designed to ensure more guilty verdicts, concerns the 
extension to women of the possibility of pleading benefit 
of clergy. This device had been introduced in the Mid-
dle Ages to save men in holy orders, but during the early 
modern period broadened to allow any man who could 
read a verse from the fifty-first Psalm (popularly known 
as the “neck verse”) off on pain of branding. From 1623 
women too became eligible for benefit of clergy in some 
cases, and were exempted form the literacy test.  Dur-
ing the last decades of the seventeenth century, how-
ever, women were being increasingly held responsible 
for property crime, and so more frequently facing the 
prospect of a death sentence54. When, in 1691, benefit 
of clergy was allowed to women on the same footing 
as men, the gender imbalance was corrected, but at the 
same time potential prosecutors and juries were relieved 
of the responsibility of sending large numbers of women 
to the gallows. The measure may, Beattie suggests, have 
contributed to the conspicuous rise in prosecutions of 
women during the 1690s and 1700s, and very probably 
51  Officially excluded by law until well into the 19th century, solicitors 
and lawyers seem to have begun appearing for the defence  – often 
without their presence being noted in official records – from the 1730s, 
perhaps the 1720s.  
52 J.H. Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2005, pp. 158-165. 
53 Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, cit., p. 319. 
54 Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, cit., pp. 141-143. 
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to the fall in acquittals from one third to 14%55. As we 
shall now see, it was not only with respect to women 
that early modern governments sought to tighten the 
practical operation of the law by offering alternatives to 
the drastic forms of punishment laid down in the penal 
code. 
EFFECTIVE PUNISHMENTS.
The innovation in the justice system most perti-
nent to Beccaria’s thinking regards the proportionality 
of punishment to the crime, discussed in Chapter VI 
of the treatise. This notion seems in have circulated in 
early modern England for many years before being put 
partially into practice in the second decade of the eight-
eenth century, though in a form that would not, as we 
shall see, have satisfied Beccaria. With only whipping, 
branding and the pillory available as punishments for 
less serious offenses, and death for most felonies, «the 
criminal law provided the narrowest of penal options»56. 
As a series of Tudor statutes excluded benefit of clergy 
from a long series of offences from petty treason to pick-
pocketing, capital punishment became the only penalty 
for a huge range of crimes, and under Elizabeth large 
numbers of those convicted, even of non-violent thefts, 
were sentenced to death57. During the final decades of 
the seventeenth century more potential victims of the 
gallows were saved by jury manipulation of verdicts and 
the exercise of judicial discretion, for example in apply-
ing the literacy test for benefit of clergy less strictly. 
This tendency declined in the 1590s but accelerated 
once more in the second quarter of the seventeenth cen-
tury, when more convicted offenders were let off with a 
branded thumb, a whipping or, in a few cases, pardoned 
on condition of accepting transportation to the new 
American colonies58. Overall, Ian Archer argues, the 
criminal law was becoming «a more subtle and flexible 
instrument in discrimination between degrees of seri-
ousness in crime»59. 
This trend, according to Beattie, «must have derived 
from shared views about the best way to manage capital 
punishment, and from a growing conviction that there 
was a need for alternative sanctions», and it was these 
assumptions, he supposes, that provided 
55 Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, cit., p. 318. 
56 Ibidem, p. 283.
57 Ibidem, p. 278.
58 Ibidem, p. 279.
59 I. Archer, The Pursuit of Stability. Social Relations in Elizabethan 
England, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991, p. 248; Beattie, 
Policing and Punishment in London, cit., p. 280. 
the seed-bed for the radical ideas that came to be expressed 
in the remarkable outburst of writing and speculation 
about the criminal law that followed the breakdown of 
authority after 1642 and accompanied the experiments in 
governance in the 1650s60.
During these revolutionary times law reform 
became «an issue of urgent concern», especially among 
radical groups but also within the Rump Parliament, 
which appointed Matthew Hale to lead a committee 
to recommend ways of restructuring the criminal law. 
Leveller Gerard Winstanley was the perhaps the only 
critic to support total abolition of capital punishment, 
but many of the leading pamphleteers took the view 
that punishment ought to be proportional to the offence 
[...]. There was general agreement, for example, that minor 
thefts should not be punishable by hanging, and some writ-
ers would have removed capital punishment from all prop-
erty crimes61.
These proposals drew on various types of bibli-
cal, ethical and pragmatic argument: the Law of Moses 
offered no justification for killing a thief, the prospect of 
executing an offender discouraged prosecutors, encour-
aged juries to acquit and judges to pardon, and even led 
robbers to kill their victims in order to silence potential 
witnesses. 
With the Restoration, public speculation on such 
matters closed down:
to all outward appearance, little was to change for the next 
thirty years. The courts continued to administer a criminal 
law that provided the narrowest of penal options and that 
continued to rely on the discretionary manipulation of sen-
tences to construct a more flexible outcome62.
Yet, as Beattie underlines, in this period Old Bailey 
acquittal rates for property offences reached very high 
levels (48% for women and 42% for men), while almost 
30% of defendants received partial verdicts.  This pattern 
of jury behaviour may have been in part due to conflict 
between City and Crown, but also expressed dissatis-
faction with the punishments available to the courts, a 
dissatisfaction perhaps influenced by the radical debates 
of the 1650s. In addition, a high proportion of those 
sentenced to death were reprieved and then pardoned, 
often unconditionally: between the 1660s and the 1680s 
the rate of free pardoning rose from 13% to 40%63. In 
60 Policing and Punishment in London, cit., p. 280. 
61 Ibidem. 
62 Ibidem, p. 282.
63 Ibidem, p. 295.
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the 1690s rising prosecution rates (especially of women) 
and the effects of the Bloody Code led to such dire over-
crowding of the notoriously unhealthy London gaols 
that inmates were simply set free, taking the total enjoy-
ing impunity between 1680 and 1714 to 60% of those 
convicted.  Of the few who did go to the gallows, many 
were pitied and celebrated by the crowds whom public 
executions were meant to terrify and deter; it became a 
point of pride, especially among highwaymen, to put on 
a brave show at the gallows and “die game”. As Mandev-
ille and others were to complain, the traditional four-
hour hanging-day processions from Newgate to Tyburn 
were also occasions for disorder and disruption and pro-
vided excellent pick-pocketing opportunities.    
Dissatisfaction with the death penalty as the only 
punishment for property crime does not, of course, 
imply satisfaction with the impunity enjoyed by the 
convicted. The anonymous author of Hanging not pun-
ishment enough thought that even more severe punish-
ments should be adopted for certain types of crimes, and 
Mandeville that hanging should take place far from pub-
lic view, a proposal that was to be reiterated by Henry 
Fielding on the grounds that what is unseen is more ter-
rifying than what is done in plain sight. But for non-
violent thefts, most writers – and probably most juries 
– took the view that more moderate punishments would 
be more appropriate, more productive of convictions, 
and hence more effective as deterrents.  
But what were the alternatives?  Whipping was 
seen only appropriate for the least serious offences, and 
as traditionally performed in the street on half-naked 
convicts, usually women, was by the eighteenth cen-
tury becoming in any case less acceptable to a polite 
and commercial people64. During wartime the option 
of enlisting in the armed forces offered a solution which 
was evidently temporary and applied only to able-bod-
ied men65. Restitution of two to four times the value 
of goods stolen had been proposed during the 1650s, 
but was clearly only applicable to those in a position to 
pay.  The most popular and frequently proposed alter-
native to hanging involved the equivalent of slavery as 
recommended by Beccaria in Chapter XXVIII of his 
treatise: hard labour in a house of correction or work-
house, or in the colonies. Since the creation of Bride-
well in the sixteenth century houses of correction had 
been favoured as punitive and reformative contexts for 
minor offenders,66 and during the late seventeenth cen-
tury London magistrates made increasing use of their 
summary powers to commit defendants to them direct-
64 Ibidem, pp. 304-305.
65 Ibidem, pp. 366-367.
66 Ibidem, p. 281.
ly67. But as in the case of the street watch, the finan-
cial burden of running these institutions fell on local 
communities, which understandably objected to hav-
ing convicts dumped on them without compensation 
68. The Hard Labour Act of 1706-7 authorising judges 
to sentence clergied offenders to long periods of hard 
labour in houses of correction made «an important ges-
ture towards filling crucial gap in the penal structure. It 
pushed out the boundaries of the possible and acceptable 
forms of punishment», but failed in practice due to lack 
of financial provision69. 
A sentence of several years’ hard labour in the 
American or West Indian colonies had for a time 
seemed to offer the solution. During the 1650s transpor-
tation had been the favoured condition for pardoning, 
and throughout the 1660s merchants with trans-Atlan-
tic interests seem to have been eager to take the con-
demned70.  Efforts were also made in parliament to allow 
judges to assign directly it as a punishment for certain 
offenses, and although these bills failed, courts found 
«back-door» ways of extorting convicts’ agreement to 
be transported71. By the 1670s, however, several colo-
nies were establishing slave economies, and merchants 
became increasingly reluctant to take any but able-bod-
ied and skilled young men; as a result, as we have seen, 
the gaols filled to bursting and the pardon rate rocketed. 
During the 1690s and 1700s war, and optimistic expecta-
tions of newly established houses of correction in Lon-
don offered some respite, but with the coming of peace 
in 1713, the prospect of thousands of demobilised sol-
diers and sailors swarming the streets, and the contested 
accession of the first Hanoverian monarch in 1715, fears 
of crime and disorder once again intensified. It was this 
combination of factors that seems to have galvanised the 
new Whig ministry into seeking more lasting solutions: 
A century after the first convicts were sent to America, and 
at a point when it seemed unlikely ever to a workable ele-
ment on English penal practice, the punishment of trans-
portation to the American colonies was suddenly put on a 
new footing and the administration of the criminal law was 
entirely transformed as consequence72.
The Transportation Acts of 1718 and 1720, which 
authorised courts to sentence those found guilty directly 
to transportation and provided for payment of the costs 
of carrying them was followed by a drop in the percent-
67 Ibidem, p. 309.
68 Ibidem, p. 367.  
69 Ibidem, pp. 335-336.
70 Ibidem, p. 290.
71 Ibidem, pp. 291-293.
72 Ibidem, p. 369.
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age of men and women sentenced to death for property 
offences from just over 9% to 5.6%. For the thirty years 
that followed, until the War of Independence, transpor-
tation was to be the most common punishment assigned 
for property crimes, accounting for nearly 80% of sen-
tences for such offenses. 
But did transportation work? And was transporta-
tion seen by its “beneficiaries” as the kind of “moderate” 
punishment enjoined in Dei Delitti e delle pene?  For Bec-
caria, to commit a convict to slavery to be performed in 
obscurity or at a distance, whether in a prison context or 
in a nation other than the one offended by the crime, ren-
dered that slavery useless (Ch. XXIX): the penalty must 
be performed publicly and at the scene of the crime if 
it was to act as an effective deterrent. In practice, more-
over, the introduction of systematic transportation led to 
a reduction in relative but not absolute numbers of men 
and women executed; many of those sent to labour abroad 
would earlier have been acquitted, received partial ver-
dicts or free pardons, or never have reached the court-
room at all. There were frequent mutinies on transport 
ships, and many risked the gallows by returning before 
their time was up; one suspects that the plantations did 
not offer the rosy opportunity to reform and make a new 
life pictured by Defoe in Moll Flanders and Colonel Jack. 
In 1790s, by which time Tasmania had taken the place 
of America as the destination for transports, a group of 
women condemned for pocket-picking repeatedly told the 
judge that they preferred to be hanged in England than be 
eaten by the savages and wild beasts rumoured to roam 
the antipodes; eventually, in order to avoid a mass hang-
ing, they were discharged. Within years transportation 
had been discarded as the standard punishment for prop-
erty crime, and penitential solutions first experimented in 
the late 1770s being brought in its place73.
IN CONCLUSION.
As we have seen, the practical changes effected in 
English policing and punishment between the Resto-
ration and the mid-eighteenth century often diverged 
sharply from the proposals that were to be put forward 
by Beccaria in the 1760s and elaborated by Blackstone, 
Eden and Bentham. The deep reasons for these diver-
gences need investigating more thoroughly, but the fact 
of their existence does not invalidate the argument that 
early eighteenth-century efforts to make judicial pro-
cesses more effective in dealing with urban crime were 
‘Beccarian’ in tendency:
73 T. Hitchcock and R.B. Shoemaker,  Tales from the Hanging Court, 
Bloomsbury Academic, London 2010, ch. 5. 
Piecemeal though these responses were, they anticipated 
some of the arguments that would be made by the reform-
ers of the late 18th century. Moderate punishments would 
encourage victims to prosecute, and potential offenders 
would learn that if they committed a crime they would be 
caught, if caught convicted, and if convicted punished74. 
If scholars intent on tracing Beccaria’s importance 
for English judicial thinking have failed to notice the 
ways in which late eighteenth century reformers’ argu-
ments were “anticipated”, it is surely because they have 
– understandably – focused on the history of ideas as 
expressed in print by men educated enough to engage 
in theoretical debate.  But as historians who study 
social processes “from below” contend, we need to pay 
as much attention to practice as to ideas if we are to 
understand how change takes place, and in this respect 
the actions of ordinary people may be as influential as 
the treatises of intellectuals. The transformation of Eng-
lish law and English legal institutions traced by Beattie 
and other social historians of recent years grew largely 
out of thousands of individual decisions by the mer-
chants, financiers and lawyers who initiated private 
members’ bills in parliament and acted as magistrates 
and aldermen, the shop-keepers, artisans and craftsmen 
who prosecuted (or decided not to prosecute), manipu-
lated jury verdicts, served as constables or hired depu-
ties in their place.  Recent research by Tim Hitchcock 
and Robert Shoemaker has broadened and deepened the 
picture still further, investigating the agency exercised 
with respect to the penal system by the poor and crimi-
nal, the «apparently powerless Londoners who uninten-
tionally helped to shape the changing character of the 
institutions and policies with which they were forced to 
engage»75. Even more «piecemeal and ad hoc» than the 
measures outlined above, their tactics may have deter-
mined changes even more significant.
74 Beattie, Policing and Punishment in London, cit., p. 475. 
75 T. Hitchcock and R. B. Shoemaker, London Lives: Poverty, Crime and 
the Making of a Modern City, 1690-1800, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2015, p. 22.
